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Abstract: 
 
The following paper explores the effectiveness of microfinance policy on the registered level of 
participation in Kenya. The research is conducted through the lens of Acemoglu and Robinson’s 
view of deep institutional issues restraining policy from its intended reform. Specifically, the 
paper looks at the effectiveness in increasing the total number of borrowers after Kenya’s 
National Microfinance Act of 2006 in regard to property right protection issues within the 
country. Ultimately, the research reinforces the idea that institutional issues, both political and 
economic, are a severe handicap to microfinance within a developing country. 
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I. Introduction       
Microfinance institutions (MFI) offer an avenue to reduce poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Currently, 69.9% of people living in this region live on less than the equivalent of $2.00 a day 
(Forget, 2013). The region also experiences widespread disease and political as well as social 
unrest that further plague chances at economic prosperity. In Kenya, the prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS (4.8% for 15-49 year olds) as well as neonatal issues is a huge impediment to 
individual prosperity for many families. Increasingly, researchers are evaluating tools such as 
microfinance, to determine the best methods to alleviate poverty in the region. Microfinance is a 
relatively young and growing industry that relies, much of the time, on donor support to provide 
credit opportunities to the poor. This paper focuses on the proliferation of microfinance as well 
as the effectiveness of policies in changing the absolute number of borrowers. Specifically, I 
focus on the impact of the National Microfinance Act of 2006 in Kenya.         
Many economic development scholars recognize the importance of stable institutions for 
the long-term economic growth of countries as well as specific industries within a country. For 
example, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson write that “Economic institutions matter for 
economic growth because they shape the incentives of key economic actors in society,” which 
will ultimately determine key factors for production, such as the business environment available 
to all citizens of a given country (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005, p.389). They continue on to say 
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that political power determines economic institutions. The institutions present in a country are 
capable of constricting or allowing business to flourish despite trendy policy reforms that do not 
address deep institutional issues. I examine Kenya’s National Microfinance Act of 2006 through 
the policy and institutional framework established by Acemoglu and Robinson. Specifically, 
deep institutional issues are stifling to positive policy attempts.   
Property rights and contract enforcement are of first-order importance for the 
development and sustainability of business in a given country. I argue that property rights are 
relatively more important for the poor in a society, and at the very least, lack of rights inhibits 
this demographic the most. This assumption has implications for the state of microfinance in a 
given country. Much of the target population for microfinance programs, especially in Sub-
Saharan Africa, are the poorest in the region. When property rights are disrupted, it disrupts the 
fundamental point of microfinance institutions. That is, allowing poor entrepreneurs the space 
and material necessary to thrive. The underlying principle guiding this paper is the assumption 
that policy initiatives are not capable of pushing economic growth without objectively stable 
political and economic institutions. The question asked throughout this paper; is policy without 
strong institutions enough to affect microfinance participation in Kenya? The following paper 
uses property rights as the measure of institutional effectiveness when evaluating policy 
implications. The research conducted, points to the idea that proliferation of microfinance in a 
country is difficult to come by and sustain simply from policy initiatives that are not backed by 
solid institutions and business environments. Specifically, the lack of microfinance participation 
in Kenya is due to a lack of property rights enforcement that degrades the business environment 
for potential microfinance borrowers.  
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II. Historical Analysis    
 Microfinance is the financial service provided by intermediaries that offer loans, credit, 
or insurance to low-income individuals who would not otherwise be capable of financing a 
business venture (Ann, 2018). Many of the beneficiaries of these financial services cannot secure 
a traditional bank loan. There are several reasons for this. First, offering, maintaining, and 
monitoring the status of the loan leads to extremely high transaction costs that make justifying 
the loan at such a low amount, around $973 on average in developing countries, difficult. The 
average operating expense for microfinance portfolios has hovered around 26.7% of the total 
portfolio value which is high in relation to more traditional lending practices (Nkungi, 2013). 
This operating expense is also high in comparison to the larger microfinance industry. For 
example, Caribbean microfinance organizations are generally operating at the benchmark of 
18.8% (CMA, 2011). Second, most of those in need of microfinance assistance lack credit 
worthiness to their name and pose too great a risk for little reward to any traditional lender.  For 
example, the first modern version of microlending occurred when Dr. Muhammed Yunus offered 
42 women the small funds necessary buy raw materials for the stools they created. No other 
traditional financial lending institution was present in the area or willing to loan the women such 
a small amount (Ann, 2018).        
MFI is the term commonly used when referring to any organization offering credit and 
savings opportunities to the poor as a business model. MFIs can be non-governmental 
institutions, government banks, savings and loan cooperatives, commercial banks, and other 
financial organizations. There exists a myriad of differing laws and policies that dictate the way 
in which these organizations can offer and recoup loans. This has implications for the effect and 
pervasiveness of these organizations in the communities they set out to affect. The World Bank 
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defines microfinance as one of the key development tools when looking to promote economic 
growth. The organizations that push microfinance and microcredit programs generally involve 
social intermediation of some sort (Ledgerwood, 1999). Examples of this include “group 
formation, development of self-confidence, and training in financial literacy and management 
capabilities among members of a group” as well as training in skills related to the entrepreneurial 
endeavors many times associated with microloans (Ledgerwood, 1999). The programs do not 
generally experience success without a related mechanism to teach the beneficiaries the basic 
principles of business and saving practices (Ledgerwood, 1999).  
 Dr. Muhammad Yunus is the founder of modern microfinance. Dr. Yunus gained this title 
after he began lending money to poor villagers in and around Bangladesh in the mid-1970s. 
Throughout the 1970s, governmental organizations looked to offer credit to farmers who did not 
have access to credit dealing institutions (Ledgerwood, 1999). Stimulating agricultural 
production among low-income farmers was the main goal of many of these organizations. Dr. 
Yunus looked past the agricultural implications of the credit programs and began loaning money 
to women at no interest in to help break their cycle of debt (MicroWorld, 2019). Yunus 
eventually founded the Grameen Bank in 1983 which gave structure to his endeavor and allowed 
him to reach a larger portion of the rural poor (Ann, 2018). The Grameen Banks encouraged 
other MFI organizations to begin loaning in small amounts as well (MicroWorld, 2019). Dr. 
Yunus demonstrated that microfinance is a legitimate business even when working with the 
poorest would-be entrepreneurs. The Grameen Bank relies on two separate principles to operate. 
The first is the group liability mechanism, which encourages borrowers to pay back their loans in 
order to uphold their reputation within the lending group. Second, the bank positions itself in 
areas where there is little else in the way of lending opportunities. In short, they become the sole 
 7 
 
supplier in many areas for potential borrowers. These two guiding business principles have led 
the Grameen Bank to a recovery rate of 96.67% without the requirement of collateral 
(Pattanaveerangkoon, 2014). This recovery rate may be positive for a sustainable business 
model, but the organization has received criticisms for high pressure to repay loans at all costs.     
 Similar ventures to Dr. Yunus’ proliferated quickly around the world. Similar to the 
original model, America ACCION International, a leading group in the microfinance field, 
successfully implemented a system of group lending to urban vendors in Latin America starting 
in the 1980s. There was reaction throughout financial institutions other than NGOs. In Indonesia, 
the Bank Rakyat offered incentives for on time payment and saving between its borrowers and 
staff associates at the bank (Ledgerwood, 1999). The 1990s brought about further 
commercialization of the microfinance industry. Institutions found they needed to restructure to 
better attract commercial investors (MicroWorld, 2019). There was not enough grant funding in 
order to keep pace with the growth associated with the industry. Due to this change to more 
formal business practices, there was much more transparency and incentive for formal financial 
institutions in the funding. For example, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank and Citigroup have all 
entered into microfinance ventures in the last 20 years due to the proven business model 
(MicroWorld, 2019).      
 Microfinance continues to grow throughout the world at a rate consistently greater than 
9%. In 2016 there were 123 million customers with a total loan portfolio of $102 billion (BNP, 
2017). Much of this growth is focused in South Asia, which boasts around 60% of all borrowers 
around the world. Following them is Latin America and the Caribbean with $42.5 billion in 
outstanding loans (BNP, 2017). In contrast, Sub-Saharan Africa only has a total of $8.7 billion 
dollars in the MFI sector. Today, most of the people who borrow around the world are women in 
 8 
 
rural areas. Along with this, MFIs generally offer several other services to enable their customers 
and beneficiaries to succeed. These educational services include workshops aimed at 
disadvantaged group, which in many cases are the women microfinance organizations are 
lending to.       
 Many in African countries currently do not have access to any microfinance options to try 
and pull them out of the cycle of poverty. As of 2007, only 12.7% of the poorest families in 
Africa had any access to MFIs whereas 78.5% of the poorest in Asia had access to micro lending 
institutions (UN, 2013). Despite the efforts of many NGOs and financial institutions, there are 
still many people on the continent not capable of securing the miniscule amount of funding 
needed for entrepreneurial endeavors. In the early period of microfinance, many countries 
formed state run programs aimed at the agricultural sector. These early state run programs faced 
“subsidy dependence, low recovery rates, inadequately diversified portfolios, inadequate credit 
targeting and rent-seeking by credit officials” (UN, 2013, p.26). The corruption associated with 
property rights, judicial enforcement, and loan officials was extremely detrimental to the early 
versions of microcredit lending. These issues made it difficult for microfinance programs to 
remain viable and cut short the reach these programs could have had otherwise.          
 African microfinance operations also have high operating costs. The average operating 
cost of an MFI in Africa in 2010 was 32.6% of their entire loan portfolio (Atikus, 2014). This is 
slightly higher than the world average of 30% operating costs for MFIs (Kringlen, 2016). These 
MFIs generally lack the necessary numbers of competent and trained professionals. In the 
financial sector throughout much of Africa, there are few professionals capable of handling the 
audit and law sectors of the business (Atikus, 2014). In the World Bank’s report on the status of 
the microfinance industry, it mentions that “Many MFIs never reach either the minimal scale or 
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the efficiency necessary to cover costs” (Ledgerwood, 1999, p.4). This is due to the high risk in 
certain situations associated with these loans which require high interest rates to stay operational 
which in turn segment out certain potential clients that would otherwise choose to borrow with 
more reasonable rates. This situation is further hurt by a lack of property rights as well as 
contract enforcement. The risk associated with transactions and the loans themselves is raised as 
institutional issues such as a lack of property rights protection and contract enforcement are 
degraded. This, in turn, pushes out potential borrowers. As mentioned before, there needs to be a 
mix of community accountability and need in the area for microcredit opportunities to be viable 
as it was in Bangladesh for The Grameen Bank.                 
 Donor influence has remained an extremely important force in microfinance operations. 
This is due to the structure of these organizations and their reliance on the donors. Armendariz 
and Morduch (2011) write that “profitability has been elusive” for many of these organizations. 
The lack of established and effective financial practices in regard to these microfinance 
operations keeps them from profitability and leads them to rely on donors for support in order to 
keep the operation viable. This leaves much of the power in the hands of the donors who 
generally are not on the ground or well informed. They also make clear that many times, the MFI 
programs that cannot remain financially afloat are programs that are most celeb rated for their 
work in impoverished communities (Armendariz & Morduch, 2011).         
Morduch and Armendariz summarize research pointing to the idea that reliance on donors 
has given the donors a larger and more effective voice, but that with this voice the donors have 
generally called for a reduction in subsidies. They write that donors fear past mistakes and now 
prefer subsidization only cover startup costs (Armendariz & Morduch, 2011). The question of 
the amount of subsidies in microfinance naturally brings up the question of what effects and 
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reasons were the subsidies there in the first place. Morduch makes clear that the argument for 
subsidies within the microfinance industry is justifiable when thinking of the social impact it can 
have on a community, but that the financial prudence of the subsidy is a more difficult question 
to answer (Armendariz & Morduch, 2011). Microfinance operations are there for credit lending 
purposes, but they are also around to provide positive social impact for many poor people. Few 
studies however have been able to effectively analyze the impact of positive externalities on 
these poor communities. For example, Kenyan NGOs that offer microfinance services many 
times also offer educational outlets that improve residents’ future prospects as well as help 
integrate them into the advancing economy around them. One such example of an NGO that does 
both in Kenya is the Tembo Education Group and its affiliates. Policies aimed at the 
microfinance industry must consider all of the secondary and tertiary effects of their actions and 
funding decisions.    
In addition to the issues facing state run microfinance institutions in Africa during the 
1980s, private financial organizations faced issues staying in the market of micro lending, as 
state run endeavors and heavy subsidization of other programs forced them out (UN, 2013). 
Financial sector reforms spread across Africa in the late 1980s, which led to a more market based 
response to banking. This included the liberalization of interest and exchange rates, privatized 
most banks, and opened the finance sector to foreign competition. After this liberalization of the 
finance industry, there was a second round of financial reforms that swept in the 1990s that 
included improvements to the auditing, accounting, and regulatory systems (UN, 2013). This is 
where there was a split in the belief of the effect of microfinance regulation. The two opinions 
were that deepened regulation either would provide more structure and positive regulation for 
MFIs or would simply make the legal structure too complicated for small MFIs to operate.   
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The debate over the impact and stated importance of microfinance is most clear when 
analyzing debates of the microfinance schism. The term, coined by Morduch, refers to the 
disagreements between institutionalists and welfarists in the field of microfinance. 
Institutionalists generally expect a financial model of microcredit lending that emphasizes 
financial sustainability and “best practices” utilized by credit granting organizations (Brau & 
Woller, 2004). This model typically makes the institution much less reliant on donor opinion and 
also emphasizes the importance of a sustainable business model. Welfarists do not focus as much 
on sustainability in the financial model, rather they focus on the depth of outreach provided by 
these programs (Brau & Woller, 2004). Depth of outreach includes things like social impact and 
the ability of the organization to pull a large quantity of an area’s poor out of poverty. This is in 
contrast to the view of institutionalists who place sustainability as a business model above all 
else.      
Research suggests that there is a trade-off between depth of outreach and the financial 
sustainability of a given microfinance organization (von Pischke, 1996). This leads to 
institutionalists and welfarists as diametrically opposed with the question of subsidies as the 
point of contention. Both sides have viable arguments as the welfarists conclude that donations 
and subsidies are counted in the form of equity (Brau & Woller, 2004). They believe these 
donors are social impact investors and that if an organization is only financially sustainable 
through their help, it is still a viable model. In addition, research points to the idea that true self-
sufficiency is achieved in countries in which the borrowers are only slightly above or slightly 
below the poverty line (Navajas et al., 2000).   
  
III.  History and Current State in Kenya   
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  Kenya has served as an economic leader in East Africa and has recently 
experienced years of growth as well as some stagnation in their GDP. The country sits just under 
$1,170 per capita per year which outpaces its southern neighbor Tanzania at $900 per capita per 
year. Annual GDP growth increased from 0.2% in 2002 to 7% in 2007 (ATC, 2013). Following 
this economic upturn, violence surrounded the 2007 elections which predictably had an adverse 
effect on the economic climate of the country and the region. The country and citizens 
experienced a large amount of displacement and civil unrest. Over one million people were 
displaced and around 500,000 lost residences as unrest spread. This unrest had a direct impact on 
the Kenyan economy in the form of millions of lost Kenyan shillings in property value and had a 
direct adverse effect on the microfinance industry (ATC, 2013). The country’s GDP began to get 
back on track as of 2009, but the economic climate is still altered. The World Bank reports that 
72% of the increase in GDP from 2006 to 2013, the year the National Microfinance Act was 
instituted, was due to an increase in the service sector. That said, the agricultural sector is still 
fairly stagnant with growth at 2% (ATC, 2013). This has profound impacts on microfinance in 
Kenya, as well as many other rural regions, as microfinance is historically meant to bolster 
agricultural production and microenterprises.  
Microfinance is a substantial industry within Kenya today and has impacts ranging from 
financial to positive social externalities. Microfinance is a relatively new industry within Kenya 
and though it was around in the 1980’s, did not receive recognition and much awareness until the 
1990’s (Hospes, 2002). An indirect bolster occurred in the microfinance industry within Kenya 
from 1992-1994 in the form of financial restructuring. The government of Kenya implemented a 
Structural Adjustment Program which led to a liberalization of the economy (Hospes, 2002). 
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This led to a more accessible business environment for would-be entrepreneurs. The Government 
also anticipated effects against those not protected in the newly competitive economy and 
responded by identifying programs and initiatives that may require donor support, which 
included microfinance enterprises. The government identified a lack of access to credit as a 
major blockade to entrepreneurial development within the country. Following this liberalization 
of the economy, donations and subsidies were extremely common leading to estimates of around 
80 million USD between the two from various NGOs and private donors by just 2002 (Hospes, 
2002). At this point, several different types of microfinance agencies emerged. This includes 
agencies that are modeled off best business practices as well as agencies that simply used 
microfinance as a vessel for positive social impact initiatives. The lines between these two types 
of agencies are blurred, but the difference is in the objective of the company. Many companies 
are focused on the profit possibilities of microfinance, whereas others see microfinance as one of 
many tools to affect the lives of the poor.  
There are several lending strategies that are in Kenya due to inspiration from the 
Grameen Bank style of lending. First, there is the group-lending model which puts prospective 
borrowers into larger cohorts to take advantage of possible economies of scale as well as 
diversify the risk for borrowers. With large groups of borrowers, portfolio managers are more 
capable of organizing and keeping track of the group, and the group may also build a formal 
accountability system amongst the members. Second, many lending decisions are based off of an 
informal character appraisal system. When collateral is not an option for the client, this system is 
generally used. This is the main method utilized by The Grameen Bank. The bank or 
microfinance organization relies on community pressure to ensure the paying back of loans. 
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Third, there is a focus of the institutions on offering credit to very low income people and very 
small businesses (Hospes, 2002).      
A census conducted by the Government of Kenya in 2007 evaluated the current state of 
microfinance in Kenya. The census included a broad review of the financial sector as well as a 
review of the more niche microfinance industry. Looking at the overview of the financial sector, 
there were 5,122 SACCOs (savings and credit cooperatives), 42 commercial banks, 3 public 
banks, 2 mortgage financing companies, and 1 non-banking financial institution. Focusing in on 
the microfinance industry, it is necessary to analyze a 2003 study. In this study there were 3,460 
legally constituted microfinance service providers. This broke down into 3,397 savings and 
credit cooperatives, 56 microfinance institutions, four commercial banks, two building societies, 
and the Kenya Post Office Savings Bank. Interesting to note is the number of organizations and 
groups listed in the study that are not registered by the Government of Kenya. The study 
revealed 17,305 rotating savings and credit organizations, 115,884 registered women groups’, 
1,342 primary agricultural producer and marketing cooperative societies. These unregistered 
organizations also play a role in distributing credit and bolstering savings among Kenyans (ATC, 
2013).      
Despite the rapid growth of microfinance in Kenya, the report indicates that 35.2 % of 
Kenyans need more access to savings and credit services. Another 30.2% on Kenyans are 
reportedly unable to secure any sort of financial services. Analyzing the St. Louis Fed’s data 
regarding microfinance organization’s registration numbers, the Microfinance Act of 2006 did 
not have the intended impact and outreach in registration it was expected to at the time it was 
implemented. Estimates report that 3.8 million Kenyans depend entirely on NGOs, cooperatives, 
and the Kenya Post Office Savings Bank for financial service services. Along with this, 1.1 
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million Kenyans rely on the informal associations and networks previously mentioned due to a 
lack of red tape, as well as a last resort. The violence surrounding the 2007 elections disrupted 
the microfinance industry. Many MFI portfolios lost customers due to displacement (ATC, 
2013). In addition to this, MFIs needed to deal with the increased risk associated with the 
volatility in the financial market. Due to this increased risk, rates increased which ultimately 
pushed even more potential borrowers out of reach of these financial services (ATC, 2013).    
There are several characteristics of Kenya’s microfinance industry that make it unique. 
First, it is very concentrated with Equity Bank holding 80.4% of the industry’s total assets 
(Nkungi, 2013). It is also an industry that has experienced around 30.4% growth in the last 
several years. This is not surprising due to immaturity of the industry. The microfinance industry 
makes up 7.33% of the total GDP of Kenya (Nkungi, 2013). This is in line with other developing 
countries where microfinance has been growing. In the same year, microfinance made up 8.6% 
of Cambodia’s total GDP. The current interest rate on average in Kenya is 9.90% which reflects 
the high risk of lending in the industry (Kodongo, 2013). In addition to this, the average age of 
an individual receiving a loan is 37; which fits into the narrative that Kenya’s lending market is 
stringent in the microfinance sector (Kodongo, 2013).      
Additionally, the informal sector of microfinance in Kenya is dominated by two different 
types of organizations known as Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAS) and 
Accumulating Savings & Credit Associations (ASCAS) (Ouko, 2006). These groups fall outside 
the normal reach of government regulation. ROSCAS are groups of persons who agree to meet 
for a well-defined period of time in order to save and borrow amongst themselves. It is known 
more commonly as a “merry-go-round.” This type of savings and lending group is utilized 
mostly by women in rural communities. Members of a standard ROSCAS group will contribute a 
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set amount to a pot of money at designated times and this pot of money is distributed to a 
selected member through consensus or casting lots (Ouko, 2006). There is also a bidding system 
that can determine who will take the current pot. As with all operating procedures regarding 
informal organizations such as this, it up to the specific ROSCAs. That said, it is commonplace 
for a certain amount of funds to remain in the pot in order to meet savings and risk alleviation 
goals.         
ASCAs are distinct from ROSCAs in several ways. First, the funds in ASCAs are left to 
accumulate for a given time to develop a base for the group to lend from. There is a more long 
term focus on the lending and savings process in the ASCAs. Many times, groups of these 
organizations or people start off as small scale ROSCAs and develop into larger organizations 
and transition into an ASCA format. Both the ROSCAs and ASCAs are autonomous and 
completely voluntary for the depositors. Ultimately, most of the informal microfinance 
operations in Kenya are classified as some sort of mix between ROSCA and ASCA. The 
informal sector of microfinance is an extremely important aspect of the microfinance industry in 
Kenya as it is the only vehicle available to many poor Kenyans. The informal sector of 
microfinance in Kenya used to consist mostly of informal loan agents, and community savings 
groups. As is analyzed later in the paper, there are now more options for the poor as formal MFI 
institutions became available. Beyond policy and regulation, the Kenyan Government has 
implemented financial support periodically for informal groups of ROSCAs and ASCAs. There 
are questions as to the pass through and eventual usefulness of funds earmarked for these 
informal institutions. Low literacy and general education levels affect the ability of members in 
informal institutions to apply for formal funding from the Kenyan Government as well as 
preparing a constitution for the organization.       
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IV.  Structure and Policy Analysis in Kenya    
 
The immaturity of the microfinance industry in Kenya makes it difficult to analyze the 
effects of different policies as so few are implemented. In addition to this, there is not always 
adherence to the published rules. This is due to the lack of monitoring and enforcement of 
standards in the financial industry. The most important and most direct policy initiative affecting 
the microfinance industry is the National Microfinance Act of 2006. The act focuses on 
registering deposit taking microfinance organizations and providing protections to borrowers in 
these formal institutions. There are various other structural, legal, and policy initiatives that 
affect this young industry.       
The search for a sustainable regulatory system is necessary as government and donor 
funds are not capable of meeting all of the demand for microfinance (Saaid Ali, 2015). This 
logically leads to the conclusion that if microfinance client demand is met worldwide the void 
needs filled with self-sufficient microfinance institutions that adhere to reasonable and 
enforceable regulations (Marguerite S. Robinson, 2001). The issue Kenya’s financial sector 
struggles with is its relative informality when dealing with contract enforcement and regulation 
(Saaid Ali, 2015). Along with this, there are informational asymmetry issues that ultimately drive 
up risk for the financial intermediaries in Kenya. The policies and regulatory structures put in 
place focus on providing mechanisms and reasonable ways that guarantee enforcement.  
One of the points of contention in the microfinance industry is whether the focus of 
regulation should be on the actual MFIs themselves or the customers (Ouko, 2006). The 
argument for regulation revolving and catering to the MFIs is that they must be tightly regulated 
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to remain financially viable and ultimately capable of serving the public without being heavily 
subsidized. The other side of the argument is that MFIs should instead focus on the clients with 
their number one goal being financial inclusion. The argument stems from the same source as 
many disagreements among experts in microfinance; is microfinance more important for its 
financial or social impact effects? There have been attempts to create such a model that would 
analyze the population density discrepancies as well as the poverty differences among different 
regions in the country and tailor a non-uniform approach to fit these regions (Wanjau, 2006).      
The Government in Kenya has a relatively heavy hand in the development of the 
microfinance market and utilizes the Central Bank of Kenya to regulate the industry. An 
important distinction is that the microfinance industry splits into two different classifications. 
These classifications split as deposit taking MFIs and non-deposit taking MFIs. The Central 
Bank of Kenya is only able to effectively regulate the deposit taking MFIs. This leads to a lack 
of control for the Kenyan Government in their attempt to control and protect the infant industry. 
The Central Bank of Kenya is not able in any way to regulate less formal institutions which leads 
to a lack of regulation for borrowers. Borrowers in this situation are not guaranteed the 
protections given to borrowers of formal deposit taking institutions. In fact, the non-deposit 
taking institutions, or credit-only institutions, are not directly controlled by any Kenyan 
Government entity. They are still self-regulated by their own missions whether it be profit 
motive, social motive, or a mix of the two, as well as the agreements they come to with 
supplementary organizations. Many times, credit-only institutions and organizations rely on 
relationships established by people within close proximity. An example of this are groups of 
women that come together to build their pool of funds for lending opportunities and risk 
alleviation. They rely on their ability to judge character as well as simply remembering how 
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responsible each member and potential member are when considering whether or not to loan 
certain individuals money. This is the most informal sector of the industry as it simply cannot be 
regulated by the government, but is much of the time guided by the framework of a separate 
organization such as an NGO.     
One of the biggest problems associated with non-deposit taking MFIs is that predatory 
institutions can take advantage of poor customers (Ouko, 2006). Many times, unfavorable loan 
conditions are the only way the financial institution or organization can make a profit from their 
portfolios. They rely on relatively high interest rates as well as unreasonable collateral 
expectations. This is where regulation seen as capable of supporting vulnerable borrowers. 
Morduch (2005) suggests that microfinance generally does not help the most poor in a given 
country. The Central Bank of Kenya is not capable of reacting to or preemptively stopping these 
MFIs from taking advantage of desperate customers (Kamau, 2014). There were arrests made by 
law enforcement associated with the Central Bank of Kenya on top officials in Kenya Akiba 
Micro Financing Ltd. The officials were suspected of illegal and immoral banking practices. 
Ultimately though, convictions did not follow the arrests as the organizations fall into a grey area 
of the microfinance law. Originally, the Microfinance Act of 2006 was going to include portions 
that would regulate credit-only institutions, but this did not pan out (Kamau, 2014). The law was 
actually drafted, but ultimately not voted into effect (Kamau, 2014).       
The four most prominent policies that regulate the Kenyan microfinance industry are the 
Banking Act, Companies Act, Central Bank of Kenya Act, and the Microfinance Act of 2006. 
The policy with the most direct effects on the microfinance industry in Kenya is the 
Microfinance Act of 2006. Before 2006, the microfinance industry in Kenya remained 
unregulated, with the exception of registration requirements (Ouko, 2006). All MFIs registered 
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either as NGOs or as SACCOs. There was no split and distinction between formal and informal 
MFIs. In addition, there were no capital or licensing requirements set by the Central Bank of 
Kenya. In essence, microfinance organizations were not regulated beyond becoming registered 
and were capable of operating in any way they saw fit thereafter.     
The new Microfinance Act of 2006 provided the licensing and continued regulation 
requirements for microfinance organizations in Kenya. The act itself passed in 2006, but policies 
within it did not affect the market until 2008. The most important classifications defined in the 
act are between deposit-taking organization, credit-only institutions, and informal organizations. 
As mentioned earlier in the paper, the act only applies to deposit taking organizations, leaving 
out many credit only and informal organizations from the regulatory frameworks set out by the 
Central Bank of Kenya. In order for a deposit taking MFI to be fully registered, it must be 
registered under either the Companies Act or Banking Act as well as separately registered under 
the Microfinance Act. In order to become licensed, the organization must provide documents of 
registration as well as indicate the areas in which it will be operating (Ouko 33). Another effect 
of the instituted Microfinance Act is the inclusion of registered deposit taking MFIs under the 
“Deposit Protection Fund Board (a deposit insurance scheme) that protects depositors' deposits 
up to KES 100,000” (Saaid Ali, 2015).      
There is a tier of microfinance institutions defined by the most recent update to the 
Microfinance Act as of 2014. This tier of microfinance institutions includes credit only MFIs that 
register only with the Ministry of Finance. Due to this, the Ministry of Finance is the only body 
capable of regulating and enforcing regulation against this second tier of MFIs (Saaid Ali, 2015).  
The regulation of deposit taking institutions could force many NGOs and charitable 
organizations out of the market that are attempting to help alleviate Kenyan poverty. 
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Specifically, registering a company for a more informal deposit taking institution such as an 
NGO can be difficult in more rural areas for several reasons. First, it can be difficult for many to 
physically go to Nairobi to register the company, as this is only done in Nairobi. Many involved 
in more informal organizations may not believe this is necessary. This may be especially true 
considering Kenya’s lack of government and judiciary enforcement when considering contracts 
and policies. In addition, the literacy issues in many rural parts of the country make it difficult 
for informal groups that must communicate with authorities in Nairobi. Also, if there is no 
overarching program looking out for poor groups that are deposit taking, none of the individuals 
are likely capable of going to the lengths to register and license the group and the group likely 
also does not meet the base requirements set out in the act.     
Many microfinance programs specifically target the poor involved in the agricultural 
industry. This is a problem for registration as MFIs located very far from Nairobi are at a distinct 
disadvantage. There is simply very little enforcement compelling these small rural programs 
from registering under the new policy. Mentioned in several journal articles is the idea that an 
NGO loses the charitable aspect of its operations as soon as it registers as a deposit-taking 
microfinance organization (Ledgerwood, 1999). Many believe that registering the organization 
will make it more profit driven and less financially inclusive. Whether there is truth behind this 
implication is dubious, but regardless many organizations likely feel this perception would hurt 
their image and elect not to make the jump to register under the new act. Keeping in mind, the 
Microfinance Act actually provides restrictions on companies that help keep customers safe from 
negative lending practices.   
There are several aspects of the regulatory environment and judicial structure that have 
great impact on the economic efficiency of an industry. The microfinance industry is subject to 
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many of the same conditions that dictate success for other industries. The following sections will 
explore the importance of these separate conditions as well as use the Index of Economic 
Freedom as the rating method for Kenya’s success levels. The first condition that can determine 
success and possible proliferation of the industry is the attention paid to property rights in a 
given country. This is an especially important factor as property rights need to be clearly 
established by the rule of law and enforced consistently for business to flourish. Another key 
aspect of property rights measurements is the measure of risk that land and subsequent business 
activities may be expropriated. Similarly, the judiciary and its enforcement as well as possible 
corruption falls under this category as well. Kenya consistently scored around the world average 
for this measure, but took a large hit downward when violence surrounding the 2007 elections 
erupted. The country has since recovered in order to hover again around the world average which 
is still generally not conducive to bolstering economic prosperity.   
Another business condition measured by the Economic Freedom Index is government 
integrity. Since the 1990’s, Kenya consistently ranks below the rest of the world’s average. This 
indicates high levels of corruption and uncertainty in the business world. An interesting aspect of 
this is that there is no significant dip in the violent years surrounding the 2007 election. Rather, 
the consistently low score indicates the continued issue of corruption in the country. Possibly the 
most important variable measured by the index in relation to microfinance is the amount of 
business freedom in a country. Business freedom covers the essential aspects of starting, 
operating, and closing a business as well as the regulatory efficiency of the government in regard 
to these three functions. This has obvious ties to the previously mentioned stipulations for 
starting and licensing microfinance organizations outlined in the latest updates of the 
Microfinance Act of 2006. Business freedom reached a peak in Kenya at 67% in 2009, beating 
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the world average of 64.6% and the Sub-Saharan Africa average of 51.4%, but dropped severely 
at that point, possibly indicating negative effects from the microfinance policy that did not 
actually take effect until 2008.              
Investment freedom is the ability of individuals and organizations to move capital and 
resources internally as well as across the country’s borders. This measure is important for the 
larger microfinance firms and their ability to move and allocate investment capital. Kenya’s 
score hovers around 50%, but increases slightly after the year 2015. This still indicates fairly 
poor conditions for capital allocation. The last measurement utilized is the index for financial 
freedom. This freedom measures the level of banking efficiency present in the financial markets 
as well as the level of government interference in the sector. The measurement takes into account 
any state level run banks and factors in the country’s central bank and its ability to regulate and 
enforce contracts in order to facilitate business activities. The index dictates that ideally a high 
score in this category denotes that credit is lent at the market rate, financial institutions are 
generally self-sufficient and run as they see fit, and the central bank simply focuses on enforcing 
contracts and preventing fraud. Kenya has consistently scored around the world average of 50% 
since the early 2000s. Enforcing of contracts remains at the forefront of guaranteeing economic 
efficiency. Bentley Macleod writes about the high costs of contract enforcement and emphasizes 
the ability of informal networks utilizing factors such as reputation to regulate contract 
enforcement in the business world. The value of relationships is especially important in growing 
economies such as Kenya’s as exemplified in the supply shock to Kenyan rose exports 
(Macchiavello, 2015). These relationships are what ultimately hold together the microfinance 
industry in Kenya.    
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V. Data  
The data utilized all comes from reputable sources such as the St. Louis Fed, the 
Economic Freedom Index, and the IMF. Figure 1 graphs the dip in microfinance participation 
collected from the St. Louis Fed as a function of the drop in property rights measured from the 
Economic Freedom Index within Kenya. Figure 2 depicts the relationship between MFI 
participation in Kenya and the number of deposit-taking MFI institutions registered in the 
country which was taken from the IMF. Discussion of the actual implications behind the graph 
and data set is found in the analysis section.    
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 There is a sufficient amount of data to make this analysis and review of the microfinance 
industry in Kenya. There are several considerations when considering data from Kenya. The 
microfinance industry is a relatively young industry that strictly records data in certain areas, 
such as in Bangladesh. Second, there are a myriad of different types of microfinance 
organizations and attempting to account for all types without leaving out a critical portion is not 
feasible. Therefore, essential portions of the industry and factors that affect it directly are 
included in the collected data set. Third, sectors of the industry do not record data at all. For 
example, donor contributions are rarely accounted for and certainly not made public for many of 
the NGOs that operate in the region. Ultimately, the data is not complete, but can still help to tell 
the story of a policy’s lack of effect on actual microfinance participation despite the expectation 
that it would attract more borrowers.        
 The three variables that make up Figure 1 and Figure 2 are number of MFIs, MFI 
participation, and property rights. Respectively, the data for the three variables in order was 
pulled from the IMF, the St. Louis Fed, and the Economic Freedom Index. The number of MFIs 
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measures the number of registered microfinance institutions in Kenya during the year given. The 
registration factor gives borrowers of these institutions extra safeguards such as protection 
against high pressure repayment practices. MFI participation is the actual number of borrowers 
associated with these registered MFIs in a given year. Lastly, property rights is the measure of 
Kenya’s score in property right protection and enforcement given by The Economic Freedom 
Index.    
 
VI. Analysis  
Analyzing the given data set revolved around the theory that policies may have little 
effect if institutional issues are not kept in check. The theory posits that negative political or 
economic institutions can severely debilitate growth within a given country as well as growth 
within specific industries. The data seemingly support this framework for economic development 
by showing the correlation between a drop in property rights and a subsequent drop in 
microfinance participation. Basic assumptions suggest that an increase in microfinance 
protections that make more suitable business and entrepreneurship environments with less risk 
would lead to increased demand for microfinance loans. That said, the data show a puzzling lack 
microfinance institutions registering under the National Microfinance Act of 2006.  
 On the surface it seemed as if violence sweeping through the country was the only factor 
at play, but microfinance institutions were still multiplying and registering under the new act. As 
seen in the data, registered deposit taking microfinance organizations increased from 5 to 13 
institutions from 2004 to 2017. While the number of organizations were increasing there was a 
simultaneous decrease in the actual number of borrowers in the deposit taking microfinance 
sector. Over the same period, property rights experienced a decline while claims, which 
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represents the health of the credit sector as a whole, continued to trend upwards. The correlation 
between the two variables is at -0.76. Also, on the surface policy did have an effect on the 
number of institutions registered as they both trended upwards after the implementation year of 
2008.      
The given data allow for a murky picture unless the Acemoglu and Robinson view of 
institutions frames the data set. With this framework in mind, Kenya’s National Microfinance 
Act positively affects the number of microfinance institutions that are present and registered in 
the country, but the Act alone is not capable of overriding the issue of property rights instability. 
Property rights instability is likely due to a combination of violence, corruption, and bad business 
practices. This occurred around the 2007 elections and obviously had an adverse impact on 
business conditions at the time. This instability is an institutional issue that affects the number of 
actual microfinance borrowers in the country, and specifically the number borrowing from 
formal institutions. The issue seems magnified in the microfinance sector as the rest of the credit 
sector in Kenya continued to trend upward suggesting a healthy industry. The microfinance 
industry is a sector that is likely affected at a greater rate due to the stated purpose of the 
industry. It serves the poor of society, which is much more sensitive to poor business conditions 
as was measure by the Economic Freedom Index.     
On a side note, the formal banking sector may also be picking up prospective 
microfinance borrowers who are averse to the risk posed by the lack of property right stability. 
This falls in line with the idea that the poorest members of society are more susceptible to 
property right instability. The poor within a developing country are more likely to be affected 
and offered fewer protections against institutional issues. These issues include property rights 
issues, corruption at all levels, and the poor do not have the funds to attempt to navigate a 
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convoluted legal system. Ultimately, despite the National Microfinance Act’s incentive and 
success in to increasing the number of registered MFIs, the Act is not capable of mitigating the 
risk and convincing prospective borrowers to work with these registered MFI institutions when 
property rights continue to trend downward in the country.   
 
VII. Conclusion  
Significant research, specifically from Acemoglu and Robinson, suggests that the 
presence of solid and positive institutions are a necessary requirement for the economic growth 
of a country and specific industry. When attempting to analyze this point of view in regard to the 
microfinance industry in Kenya it is evident that there are structures and conditions preventing 
the full intended effect of a given policy. In this case, the intended protections of the National 
Microfinance Act of 2006 seem stunted due to the declining property rights within the country. 
There is also evidently more of an effect on the poorest in society and subsequently the 
microfinance industry as a whole. Ultimately, this is obviously only one aspect of the 
development argument, but is an important consideration when deciding on development 
programs that involve monetary aide or policy initiatives.    
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